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Despite being arguably one of the most active areas of research in heterodox 
macroeconomics, the study of the dynamic properties of stock-flow consistent (SFC) growth 
models of financially sophisticated economies is still in its early stages. This paper attempts 
to offer a contribution to this line of research by presenting a simplified Post-Keynesian SFC 
growth model with well-defined dynamic properties, and using it to shed light on the merits 
and limitations of the current heterodox SFC literature. 
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In recent years, a significant number of “stock-flow consistent” (SFC) Post-Keynesian growth 
models and articles have appeared in the literature,
1 making it one of the most active areas of 
research in Post- Keynesian macroeconomics. Yet, it is fair to say that most of the discussion so 
far has been phrased in terms of relatively complex, and often exploratory, (computer-simulated) 
models and that this has prevented the dissemination of the main insights of this literature to 
broader audiences.
2 This paper attempts to ease this problem by presenting a simplified (and, we 
hope, representative) Post-Keynesian SFC growth model which, in our view, sheds considerable 
light on the merits and limitations of existing (and usually more complex) heterodox SFC models, 
and could conceivably be used as a “benchmark” to facilitate discussion among authors of these 
models and authors in various other Post-Keynesian and related traditions. 
  Most of the appeal of Post-Keynesian SFC models, as well as the difficulties associated 
with them, stem from two basic features of these constructs, i.e., the facts that: (i) they are, in a 
sense to be explained below, “intrinsically dynamic” (Turnovsky 1977); and (ii) they model 
financial markets and real-financial interactions explicitly. Therefore, the relative merits of the 
SFC literature are more easily appreciated in the context of the discussion of how Post-
Keynesians have conceptualized dynamic trajectories of real economies in historical time and 
how these are affected by financial markets’ behavior. 
  Beginning with the latter issue, we have noted elsewhere
3 that there is a widespread 
consensus among prominent Keynesians of all persuasions
4 about the role played by financial 
markets, notably stock and credit markets, in the determination of the demand price for capital 
goods (and, hence, of investment demand, via some version of “Tobin’s q”) and in the financing 
of investment decisions. The role played by banks in the financing of investment is acknowledged 
by Keynes, for example, in the famous passage in which he notes that “the investment market can 
become congested through a shortage of cash” (Keynes 1937). More emphatically, Minsky argues 
                                                 
1 See Taylor (2004); Lavoie and Godley (2001–2002); Zezza and Dos Santos (2004); Foley and Taylor (2004); Dos 
Santos (2005) and (2006), among many others. The current literature builds on the seminal work of, among others, 
Tobin (1980) and (1982) and Godley and Cripps (1983). See Dos Santos (2006) for a detailed discussion of these 
authors’ contributions and Dos Santos (2005) for a discussion of the related “Minskyan” literature of the 1980s–
1990s. The seminal work of Moudud (1998) with SFC models in the tradition of classical economists is also worth 
mentioning. A recent major contribution has been provided by Godley and Lavoie (2007). 
2 A notable exception being the theoretical models in Taylor (2004). 
3 Dos Santos (2006). 
4 Such as Davidson (1972); Godley (1999); Minsky (1975); and Tobin (1982).   3 
 
 
that investment theories which neglect the financing needs of investing firms amount to “palpable 
nonsense” (Minsky 1986). 
  This consensus is extensible to the idea that asset prices are determined by the portfolio 
decisions of the various economic agents, being only marginally affected—if at all—by current 
saving flows. In the words of Davidson, “in the real world, new issues and household savings are 
trifling elements in the securities markets (…). Any discrepancy between (…) [new issues] and 
(…) [ the ‘flow’ demand for new securities] is likely to be swamped by the eddies of speculative 
movements by the whole body of wealth-holders who are constantly sifting and shifting their 
portfolio composition” (Davidson 1972). 
  In other words, most Post-Keynesians would agree that the size and the desired 
composition of the balance sheets of the various institutional sectors (i.e., households, firms, 
banks, and the government, in a closed economy) determine (short period) “equilibrium” asset 
prices which, in turn, crucially affect “real [macroeconomic] variables.” 
  Few Post-Keynesians would also disagree that “Keynes’s formal analysis dealt only with a 
period of time sufficiently brief (Marshall’s short period of a few months to a year) for the 
changes taking place in productive capacity over that interval, as a result of net investment, to be 
negligible relative to the total inherited productive capacity” (Asimakopulos 1991). Accordingly, 
many Post-Keynesians have argued that extending Keynes’s analysis to “the long period” 
involves “linking adjacent short periods, which have different productive capacities, and allowing 
for the interdependence of changes in the factors that determine the values of output and 
employment in the short period[s]” (Asimakopulos 1991). 
  Essentially the same view was espoused by Joan Robinson (1956) and by Michael 
Kalecki, in an often quoted passage in which he notes that “the long run trend is but a slowly 
changing component of a chain of short-period situations. It has no independent entity” (Kalecki 
1971). Not all Post-Keynesians agree with it, though. Skott (1989), for example, criticizes this 
Asimakopulos-Kalecki-Robinson view on the grounds that, when coupled with the usual 
Keynesian assumption
5 that firms’ short-period expectations are roughly correct, it implies—
given constant animal spirits—that the economy is always in long-period equilibrium, as defined 
by Keynes in Chapter 5 of the General Theory. While this last point is certainly correct, we do 
not see it as a bad thing. In fact, we argue in Section 3 that a careful analysis of Keynes’s long-
period equilibrium is much more useful than conventional wisdom would make us believe.  
                                                 
5 Keynes (1937).   4 
 
 
  It so happens that the careful modeling of stock-flow relations provides a natural and 
rigorous link between “adjacent short periods.” In particular, it makes sure that the balance sheet 
implications of saving and investment flows and capital gains and losses in any given short period 
are fully taken into consideration by economic agents in the beginning of the next short period. 
This, in turn, is crucial in Post-Keynesian models, for if one assumes that asset prices are 
determined by the portfolio choices of the various economic agents, one must also acknowledge 
that dynamically miscalculated balance sheets would imply increasingly wrong conclusions about 
financial markets’ behavior. 
  In sum, and despite its somewhat discouraging algebraic form, the broader goal of current 
SFC literature is very similar to the one stated by Davidson in the passage above.
6 In fact, most of 
the (simple, though admittedly tedious) algebra below is meant only to make sure we are getting 
the dynamics of the balance sheets right and, therefore, approaching Davidson’s problem from a 
more explicitly dynamic standpoint. 
  The structural and behavioral hypotheses of our model are presented in Section 2 below, 
while Section 3 discusses (the meaning of) its short and long period equilibria. Section 4 briefly 
discusses how the model presented here relates to the broader heterodox SFC literature.  
 
2. THE MODEL IN THE SHORT RUN 
 
2.1 Structural Hypotheses and their Systemwide and Dynamic Implications 
The economy assumed here has households, firms (which produce a single good, with price p), 
banks, and a government sector. The aggregated assets and liabilities of these institutional sectors 








                                                 
6 Though, in most cases, SFC models simplify Davidson’s analysis by working with one sector models and merging 
commercial and investment banks in one large banking sector. See Davidson (1972).   5 
 
 
Table 1. Aggregate Balance Sheets of the Institutional Sectors. 
  Households Firms Banks Gov’t Totals 
1 - Bank deposits  +D   -D    0 
2 - Bank loans   -L  +L    0 
3 – Gov’t bills     +B  -B  0 
4 - Capital goods   +p·K      +p·K 
5 - Equities  +pe·E -pe·E     0 
Net worth  +Vh +Vf  0  -B  +p·K 
Note: pe stands for the price of one equity 
 
  Table 1 summarizes several theoretical assumptions. First, and for simplification purposes 
only, we assume a “pure credit economy,” i.e., that all transactions are paid with bank checks. 
This hypothesis is used only to simplify the algebra and can easily be relaxed without changing 
the essence of the argument. It is important to notice, however, that the financial structure 
assumed above rules out financial disintermediation (and, therefore, systemic bank crises) by 
hypothesis. Therefore, allowing for cash holdings will be necessary in more realistic settings. 
  Households are assumed not to get bank loans and to keep their wealth only in the form of 
bank deposits and equities. The reason why households do not care to buy government bills is that 
banks are assumed to remunerate deposits at the same rate the government remunerates its bills.
7 
Banks are also assumed to: (i) always accept government bills as means of payment for 
government deficits; (ii) not pay taxes; and (iii) to distribute all its profits, so its net worth is equal 
to zero. 
  We will thus be working with the conventional case in which the government is in debt (B 
> 0), noting that not too long ago—in the Clinton years, to be precise—analysts were discussing 
the consequences of the United States paying all its debt. A negative B, i.e., a positive 
government net worth, can be interpreted in this model as “net government advances” to banks. 
We are also simplifying away banks’ and government’s investment in fixed capital, as well as 
their intermediary consumption (wages, etc.). These assumptions are made only to allow for 
simpler mathematical expressions for household income and aggregate investment. 
                                                 
7 So that lending to firms is banks’ only source of profits. According to Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), a banking 
sector with these characteristics “is not too different from what may emerge in the fairly near future in the USA.” 
In any case, this hypothesis allows us to simplify the portfolio choice of households considerably. More detailed 
treatments, such as the ones in Tobin (1980) or Lavoie and Godley (2001–2002), can easily be introduced, though 
only at the cost of making the algebra considerably heavier.   6 
 
 
  Firms are assumed to finance their investment using loans, equity emission, and retained 
profits.
8 Finally, the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem does not hold in this economy, so the 
specific way firms choose (or find) to finance themselves matters. As it has been pointed out that, 
“the greater the ratio of equity to debt financing the greater the chance that the firm will be a 
hedge financing unit”' (Delli Gatti, Gallegati, and Minsky 1994). This “Minskyan” point is, of 
course, lost in a Modigliani-Miller world, as in models in which firms issue only one form of 
debt. 
 
Table 2. “Current” Transactions in our Artificial Economy 
A (+) sign before a variable denotes a receipt, while a (-) sign denotes a payment 
Firms    Households
Current Capital 
Gov’t Banks  Totals 
1 - Consumption  -C +C       0 
2 – Gov’t expenditure   +G    -G    0 
3 - Investment in fixed K    +p·∆K -p·∆K     0 
4 - Accounting memo: “Final” sales at market prices = p·X ≡ C + G + p·∆K ≡ W + FT ≡ Y 
5 - Wages  +W -W       0 
6 - Taxes  -Tw -Tf  +T    0 
7 - Interest on loans   -ilt-1·Lt-1     +ilt-1·Lt-1 0 
8 - Interest on bills       -ibt-1·Bt-1 +ibt-1·Bt-1 0 
9 - Interest on deposits  +ibt-1·Dt-1       -ibt-1·Dt-1 0 
10 - Dividends  +Fd +Fb  -Fd      -Fb  0 
11 - Column totals  SAVh Fu  -p·∆K  SAVg 0  0 
 
  The “current flows” associated with the stocks above are described in Table 2. As such, it 
represents very intuitive phenomena. Households in virtually all capitalist economies receive 
income in form of wages, interest on deposits, and distributed profits of banks and firms and use 
it to buy consumption goods, pay taxes, and save, as depicted in the households’ column of Table 
2. We simplify away household debt and housing investment. The government, in turn, receives 
money from taxes and uses it to buy goods from firms and pay interest on its lagged stock of debt, 
while firms use sales receipts to pay wages, taxes, interest on their lagged stock of loans, and 
dividends, retaining the rest to help finance investment. Finally, banks receive money from their 
loans to firms and holdings of government bills and use it to pay interest on households’ deposits 
and dividends. 
                                                 
8 As in Godley and Lavoie (2007) and Skott (1989), for example.   7 
 
 
  In a “closed system” like ours, every money flow has to “come from somewhere and go 
somewhere” (Godley 1999), and this shows up in the fact that all row totals of Table 2 are zero. 
Note also that firms’ investment expenditures in physical capital imply a change in their financial 
or capital assets and, therefore, is a “capital” transaction. As such it (re)appears in Table 3 below. 
The reason it is included in Table 2 is to stress the idea that firms buy their capital goods from 
themselves—an obvious feature of the real world, though a slightly odd assumption in our “one 
good economy.” 
 
Table 3. Flows of Funds in our Artificial Economy 
Positive figures denote sources of funds, while negative ones denote uses of funds 
  Households Firms  Gov’t  Banks  Totals 
1 - Current 
saving 
+SAVh +Fu  +SAVg  0  +SAV 
2 - ∆ Bank 
deposits 
- ∆D     + ∆D  0 
3 - ∆ Loans    -∆L    - ∆L  0 
4 - ∆ Gov’t bills     - ∆B + ∆B  0 
5 - ∆ Capital    -p·∆K     -p·∆K 
6 - ∆ Equities  -pe·∆E +pe·∆E     0 







Vf = Fu + 
+∆p·Kt-1 −∆pe·Et-1 
+SAVg 0  SAV +∆p·Kt-1 = 
+p·∆K +∆p·Kt-1 
 
  While it is true that beginning of period stocks necessarily affect income flows, as 
depicted in Table 2, it is also true that saving flows and capital gains necessarily affect end of 
period stocks, which, in turn, will affect next period’s income flows. This “intrinsic SFC 
dynamics” is shown in Table 3. Note that fluctuations in the price of the single good produced in 
the economy (for firms) and in the market value of equities (for firms and households) are the 
only sources of nominal capital gains and losses in this economy. 
  Given the hypotheses above, households’ saving necessarily implies changes in their 
holdings of bank deposits and/or stocks, while government deficits are necessarily financed with 
the emission of government bills, and investment is necessarily financed by a combination of   8 
 
 
retained earnings, equity emissions, and bank loans. As emphasized by Godley (1999), banks play 
a crucial role in making sure these interrelated balance sheet changes are mutually consistent.
9 
  We finish this section reminding the reader that all accounts presented so far were phrased 
in nominal terms. All stocks and flows in Tables 1 and 2 above have straightforward “real” 
counterparts, given by their nominal value divided by p (the price of the single good produced in 
the economy), while the “real” capital gains in equities are given by 
 
   t t t t t t t p p E pe p E pe / ) / ( 1 1 1 1 − − − − ⋅ ⋅ ∆ − ⋅ ∆      (1) 
 
and the “real” capital gains in any other financial asset Z are given by
10 
   t t t t p p Z p / ) / ( 1 1 − − ⋅ ∆ −         ( 2 )  
 
  We believe that the artificial economy described above—though not necessarily its 
accounting details—is quite familiar to most macroeconomists in the broad Post-Keynesian 
tradition. In order to keep things simple, we will try as much as possible to “close” it with 
(dynamic versions of) equally familiar Keynes/Kalecki hypotheses. Of course, given that 
modeling “economies as a whole” from a financially sophisticated Post-Keynesian standpoint 
implies making a relatively large number of simplifying assumptions about both the behavior and 
the composition of the various relevant sectors of the economy, very few people will agree with 
everything in our model. We do hope, however, that a sufficient number of Post-Keynesians will 
deem it representative enough of their own views to deserve attention or, at least, will find it 
illuminating to phrase their dissenting views as alternative structural or behavioral hypotheses 
about the obviously simplified artifical economy discussed above. If this turns out to be the case, 
we will consider ourselves successful in our main goal of providing a “benchmark” model in 
order to facilitate discussion among economists of the various Post-Keynesian and related 
traditions. 
                                                 
9 As is well known, most macroeconomic models assume that some sort of Walrasian auctioneer takes care of 
financial intermediation. This simplification is not faithful to the views of financially sophisticated Post-
Keynesians, such as Davidson (1972); Godley and Cripps (1983); Minsky (1986); or Godley and Lavoie (2007), 
though. 
10 Given that ours is a “one good” economy, the real value of physical capital is not      
    affected by inflation.   9 
 
 
2.2 A Horizontal Aggregate Supply Curve 
Following Taylor (1991), we assume that  
     ) 1 ( τ λ + ⋅ ⋅ = t t t w p        ( 3 )  
where p = price level, w = money wage per unit of labor, λ = labor-output ratio, and τ = mark-up 
rate.
11 From (1) it is easy to prove that the (gross, before tax) profit share on total income (π) is 
given by: 













      ( 4 )  
so that the (before tax) wage share on total income is 














      ( 5 )  
and 
     t t t X p W ⋅ ⋅ − = ) 1 ( π       ( 6 )  
We assume here also that the nominal wage rate, the technology, and the income distribution 
of the economy are exogenous, so all lower case variables above are constant, and therefore the 
aggregate supply of the model is horizontal. In other words, we work here with a fix-price model 
in the sense of Hicks (1965). All these assumptions can be relaxed, of course, provided one is 
willing to pay the price of increased analytical complexity. In particular, they allow us to avoid 
unnecessary complications related to inflation accounting. 
 
2.3 Aggregate Demand 
2.3.1 A “Kaleckian SFC” Consumption Function 
The simplifying hypothesis here is that wages after taxes are entirely spent, while “capitalist 
households”—receiving distributed profits from firms and banks—spend a fraction of their 
lagged wealth—as opposed to their current income, as in Kalecki.
12 The presence of household’s 
                                                 
11 A more complex model may incorporate the effects of the interest rate on prices, if financial markets are able to 
affect production decisions. 
12 We have analyzed elsewhere (Zezza and Dos Santos, 2006) the relationship between income distribution and 
growth in this class of models, and we chose to adopt a simple specification in the present version.   10 
 
 
wealth in the consumption function is, of course, compatible with Modigliani’s (1954) seminal 
work. Formally,  
 
   1 1 ) 1 ( − − ⋅ + − ⋅ = ⋅ + − = t t t t t t Vh a W Vh a Tw W C θ     (7) 
 
where θ is the income tax rate and a is a fixed parameter. Following Taylor, we normalize the 
expression above by the (lagged) value of the stock of capital
13 to get 
 
   1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) /( − − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − = ⋅ t t t t t vh a u K p C θ π      (8) 
 
where ut = Xt/Kt-1, and vht = Vht/(pt·Kt).
14 Needless to say, equation (8) is compatible with the 
conventional, simplified Keynesian short-period specification (Ct = C0 + c·Ydt), provided one 
makes  
C0 = a·Vht-1 and c = 1 - π. 
 
2.3.2 A “Neo-Kaleckian” Investment Function 
The simplest version of the model presented here uses Taylor’s (1991) “structuralist” investment 
function which, in turn, is an extension of the one used by Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) and a 
special case of the one used in Lavoie and Godley (2001–2002). Given that investment functions 
are a topic of intense controversy in heterodox macroeconomics—see, for example Lavoie, 
Rodriguez, and Seccareccia (2004)—it would be interesting to study the implications of 
“Harrodian” (or “Classical”) specifications in which investment demand gradually adjusts to 
stabilize capacity utilization—as proposed, among others, by Shaikh (1989) and Skott (1989). 
Section 4 discusses this issue in greater detail, though space considerations have forced us to 
                                                 
13 Taylor (1991) uses the current stock of capital because he works in continuous time. As both the formalization and 
the checking—through computer simulations—of stock-flow consistency requirements are reasonably complex in 
continuous time, and no proportional insight appears to be added, we work here in discrete time and assume—as 
Keynes—that the stock of capital available in any given “short period” is predetermined, i.e., that investment does 
not translate into capital instantaneously. We thus normalize all flows by the opening stock of capital and stocks 
by the current stock of capital. 
14 Note that getting from (7) to (8) implies an inflation correction on vh, which is simplified away in the current 
model where prices are fixed.   11 
 
 
postpone a complete treatment to another occasion. Our current specification follows the broad 
structuralist literature in assuming, for simplification purposes, that the output-capital ratio is a 
good measure of capacity utilization. In symbols, we have 
    t t t il u g g ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + = 1 0 ) ( θ β π α                  (9) 
where gt = ∆Kt/Kt-1, il is the (real) interest rate on loans, and g0, α , β, and θ1 are exogenous 
parameters measuring the state of long term expectations (g0), the strength of the “accelerator” 
effect (α and β), and the sensibility of aggregate investment to increases in the interest rate on 
bank loans (θ1). In Section 4.2 we discuss what happens when one modifies this investment 
function along the lines suggested by Lavoie and Godley (2001–2002). 
 
2.3.3 The “u” Curve 
Assuming that both γt = Gt/(pt·Kt-1) and il are given by policy, the “short period” goods’ market 
equilibrium condition is given by 
1 1 0 1 ] ) ( [ ) 1 ( − − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ + − ⋅ = ⋅ t t t t t t t t t K p il u g Vh a W X p γ θ β π α θ             (10) 
or, after trivial algebraic manipulations, 
    1 1 1 ) ( − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = t t t vh a il A u ψ ψ                 (11) 
where 
    ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 /[ 1 1 1 α θ π ψ − − ⋅ − − =                          (12) 
    β π α α + ⋅ = 1                   (13) 
    t t t il g il A γ θ + ⋅ − = 1 0 ) (                  (14) 
 
  Equation (11) is essentially the normalized “IS” curve of the model. Notice that, as for a 
textbook IS curve, the level of economic activity is determined by a multiplier ψ1, times 
autonomous demand A, which here is given by the normalized government expenditure γ and 
autonomous growth in investment g0, plus additional effects from the interest rate and the 
opening stock of wealth. 
  In fact, the “short period” equilibrium of the model, represented in Figure 1, has a 
straightforward “IS-LM” (of sorts) representation, which implies that “short period” comparative   12 
 
 
static exercises can be done quite simply. Note finally that, the (temporary, goods’ market) 
equilibrium above only makes economic sense if the sum of the propensity to consume out of 
current income [i.e., (1 - π)·(1 - θ)] and the “accelerator” effect [i.e., α1 = α·π + β] is smaller 
than one. The (short period) consequences of having the income distribution impacting both the 






2.4 Financial Markets 
2.4.1 Financial Behavior of Households 
The two crucial hypotheses here are that: (i) households make no expectation mistakes 
concerning the value of Vh, and (ii) the share δ of equity (and, of course, the share 1 - δ of 
deposits) on total household wealth depends negatively (positively) on ib and positively 
(negatively) on the expectational parameter ρ.
15 Formally: 
     t
d
t t Vh E pe ⋅ = ⋅ δ        ( 1 5 )  
                                                 
15 Note that, as discussed in more detail in Section 3, the inclusion of expectation errors—say, along the lines of 
Godley (1999)—would imply the inclusion of hypotheses about how agents react to them, making the model 
“heavier.” 





Figure 1. Short-Run Flow Equilibrium   13 
 
 
     t
d
t Vh D ⋅ − = ) 1 ( δ        ( 1 6 )  
     ρ δ + − = ib         ( 1 7 )  
where ρ is assumed to be constant in this simplified “closure.”
16 The simplified specification 
above follows Keynes in assuming that the demand for equities “… is established as the outcome 
of the mass psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals (..)” and, therefore, is “liable to 
change violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation in opinion due to factors that do not really 
much make difference to the prospective yield (…)” (Keynes 1936). The value of Vh, on the other 
hand, is given by the households’ budget constraint (see Table 3 above): 
    1 1 − − ⋅ ∆ + + ≡ t t t t t E pe SAVh Vh Vh     (18) 
while from Table 2 and equation (7) it is easy to see that 
    1 1 1 − − − ⋅ − + + ⋅ + = t t t t t t Vh a Fb Fd D ib SAVh     (19) 
so that 
   1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( − − − − ⋅ ∆ + + + ⋅ + ⋅ − = t t t t t t t t E pe Fb Fd D ib Vh a Vh    (20) 
 
2.4.2 Financial Behavior of Firms 
For simplicity, we assume that firms keep a fixed E/K rate χ and distribute a fixed share µ of its 
(after-tax, net of interest payments) profits.
17 We thus have  
    ) 1 ( 1 t t t
s
t g K K E + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ = − χ χ       ( 2 1 )  
    ] ) 1 [( 1 1 1 − − − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ = t t t t t t L il K p u Fd π θ µ     (22) 
    ] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 − − − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − = t t t t t t L il K p u Fu π θ µ    (23) 
And, as the price of equity pe is supposed to clear the market, we have also that  




t E E =        ( 2 4 )  
 
                                                 
16 Though it plays a crucial role in Taylor and O’Connell’s (1985) seminal “Minskyan” model. 
17 Varying χ and µ can be easily introduced, though only at the cost of making the algebra heavier. Note, however, 
that the hypothesis of a relatively constant χ  is roughly in line with the influential New-Keynesian literature on 
“equity rationing.” See Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) for a quick survey.   14 
 
 
so that from (15) and (21): 











             (25) 
Firms’ demand for bank loans, in turn, can be obtained from their budget constraint (see 
Table 3). Indeed, from 
    t t t t t t Fu E pe K p L − ∆ ⋅ − ∆ ⋅ ≡ ∆               (26) 
 
it is easy to see that, by replacing equations (21) and (23) in (26): 
1 1 1 ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ] ) 1 ( 1 [ − − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − + = t t t t t t t t t
d
t K p u g pe p g L il L π θ µ χ µ          
(27) 
 
2.4.3 Financial Behavior of Banks and the Government 
For simplicity, banks are assumed here—a la Lavoie-Godley (2001–2002) and Godley-Lavoie 
(2007)—to provide loans as demanded by firms. In fact, banks’ behavior is essentially passive in 
the simplified model discussed here, for we also assume that: (i) banks always accept deposits 
from households and bills from the government; (ii) banks distribute whatever profits they 
make;
18 and (iii) the interest rate on loans is a fixed mark up on the interest rate on government 
bills. Formally: 




t L L L = =                           (28) 




t D D D = =                          (29) 




t B B B = =                          (30) 
      t b t ib il ⋅ + = ) 1 ( τ                          (31) 
    1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ = t t t t t t t D ib B ib L il Fb            (32) 
The government, in turn, is assumed to choose: (i) the interest rate on its bills (ib); (ii) its 
taxes (as a proportion θ of wages and gross profits); and (iii) its purchases of goods (as a 
                                                 
18 Under this assumption, allowing banks to hold a fraction δ of its deposits in equities is one and the same thing of 
adding δ* to δ  (hence our hypothesis that only households buy equities). Assuming that the banks’ net worth can 
differ from zero would only make the algebra considerably more complex, however.   15 
 
 
proportion γ of the opening stock of capital), while the supply of government bills is determined 
(as a residual) by its budget constraint: 
      1 − ⋅ ⋅ = t t t t K p G γ                           (33) 
    t t t t t t t t t X p W X p W Tf Tw T ⋅ ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = + = θ θ θ ) (          (34) 
    t t t t t t
s
t X p K p B ib B ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + = − − − θ γ 1 1 1) 1 (          (35) 
 
3. COMPLETE “TEMPORARY” AND “STEADY STATE” SOLUTIONS 
 
As noted above, the SFC approach allows for a natural integration of “short” and “long” periods. 
In particular, both Keynesian notions of “long-period equilibrium” and “long run” acquire a 
precise sense in a SFC context, the former being the steady-state equilibrium of the stock-flow 
system (assuming that all parameters remain constant through the adjustment process), and the 
latter being the more realist notion of a path-dependent sequence of “short periods,” in which the 
parameters are subject to sudden and unpredictable changes. These concepts are discussed in 
more detail in Section 3.3 below. Before we do that, however, we need discuss the characteristics 
of the “short-period” (or “temporary”) equilibrium of the model. 
 
3.1 The “Short Period” Equilibrium 
In any given (beginning of) period, the stocks of the economy are given, inherited from history. 
Under these hypotheses, and given distribution and policy parameters, we saw in Section 2.3.3 
that the (normalized) level of economic activity—assuming that the economy is below full 
capacity utilization— is given by
19 
     1 1 1 ) ( − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = t t t vh a ib A u ψ ψ             (11’) 
But (demand-driven) economic activity is hardly the only variable determined in any given 
“short period.” As noted above, the balance sheet implications of each period’s sectoral income 
and expenditure flows and portfolio decisions are also (dynamically) crucial. Here the hypothesis 
that banks have zero net worth proves to be convenient, for it implies that the stock of bank loans 
(L) is determined by the stock of government debt (B) and to the stock of household wealth (Vh). 
                                                 
19 We now use (31) into (14) to get autonomous demand relative to the interest rate on bills: A(ib)t = g0 - θ1· (1 + 
τb)· ib t  + γt.   16 
 
 
Specifically, given that L + B ≡ D (from Table 1) and D = (1 - δ)·Vh from equations (16) and 
(29), we have that  
      t t t B Vh L − ⋅ − = ) 1 ( δ            (36) 
It so happens that all other endogenous stocks and flows of the model are easily determined 
from u and (the normalized values of) B and Vh. Accordingly, the remains of this section will be 
spent computing the latter variables. The case of B is the simplest one. From equations (30) and 
(35) we have that 
    t t t t t t t t X p K p ib B B ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ = − − − θ γ 1 1 1 ) 1 (       (37) 
i.e., that the end-of-period government debt is given by beginning-of-period government debt plus 
the government’s interest payments [ibt-1·Bt-1] and purchases of public goods [γt·pt·Kt-1] minus 
its tax revenues [θ·pt·Xt]. Now, dividing the equation above by ·pt·Kt-1 and rearranging, we get 
    ) 1 /( ] ) 1 ( [ 1 1 t t t t t t g u ib b b + ⋅ − + + ⋅ = − − θ γ       (38) 
where, bt = Bt/(pt·Kt).
20 In words, the normalized value of the government debt will increase 
(decrease) when the level of government debt increases faster (slower) than the value of the stock 
of capital. 
  To calculate the normalized value of the stock of households’ wealth is a little trickier. We 
begin by noting that, from (18) above:  
  1 1 − − ⋅ ∆ + + ≡ t t t t t E pe SAVh Vh Vh   
i.e., the nominal stock of household wealth in the end of the period is given by the sum of its 
value in the beginning of period, household saving in the period, and households’ period capital 
gains in the stock market.  
  Now, note that equations (15), (21), (24), and (25) allow us to write 
     1 1 ) 1 /( − − ⋅ − + ⋅ = ⋅ ∆ t t t t t Vh g Vh E pe δ δ     (39) 
and, replacing the expression above in (18), dividing everything by pt·Kt-1, and rearranging, we 
have that 
                                                 
20 Equation (38) should include the real interest rate on bills. Since we assume inflation away in this version of the 
model, we keep the nominal interest rate ib.   17 
 
 












) 1 ( 1               (40) 
where, vht = Vht/(pt·Kt), and savht = SAVht/(pt·Kt-1).
21 Of course, vh increases whenever wealth 
grows faster than the value of the stock of capital and, as it turns out, this happens whenever the 
increase in nonequity household wealth [(1- δ)·Vht-1], represented by household saving [SAVh], 
is faster (slower) than the increase in the share of nonequity wealth in total household wealth [1 - 
δ] represented by the rate of growth of the capital stock g. This result has to do with the fact that 
increases in the rate of investment (g) also reduce the price of equities (for it increases their 
supply), creating relatively more capital losses the higher the proportion of total household wealth 
kept in equities(δ). 
  But we want an expression of vh in terms of b and u, not in terms of savh. In order to get 
one, recall equation (19): 
  1 1 1 − − − ⋅ − + + ⋅ + = t t t t t t Vh a Fb Fd D ib SAVh   
Now, replacing equations (16), (22), (29), and (32) in equation (19) and rearranging, we 
have that 
  1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − − − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + = t t t t t t t t Vh a X p B ib L il SAVh π θ µ µ       (41) 
This result is intuitive. It says that—given our hypothesis that all after-tax wage income is 
spent—households’ saving in a given period is given by banks’ distributed profits and interest 
payments [ilt-1·Lt-1 + ibt-1·Bt-1], plus firms’ distributed profits [µ·[(1 - θ)·π·pt·Xt - ilt-1·Lt-1]], 
minus the part of households’ beginning of period wealth that is spent in consumption [a·Vht-1]. 
  Now, replacing (36) in the expression above one gets  




] ) 1 [( ) 1 (
− − −
− − −
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + =
t t t t t
t t t t
Vh a X p B ib
B Vh il SAVh
π θ µ
δ µ
            (42) 
or, equivalently, using (31): 
  
t t t t b
b t t t
X p B ib
a ib Vh SAVh
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − +
+ − − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ =
− −
− −
π θ µ µ τ
δ µ τ
) 1 ( )] 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 [
] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [
1 1
1 1              (43) 
                                                 
21 The term vht-1 should also be divided by 1 plus the rate of change in prices. Again we simplify this away.   18 
 
 
i.e., households’ saving in any given period can also be written as the sum of the dividends they 
receive from firms µ·(1-θ)·pt·Xt-µ·ilt-1·[(1-δ)·Vht-1-Bt-1], the interest income they receive (via 
banks) from the government ibt-1·Bt-1, and the interest income they would receive from banks if 
all their deposits were used to finance loans to firms ilt-1·(1-δ)·Vht-1 minus the amount that is 
“lost'” due to the fact that part of this nonequity wealth is used to finance the government ibt-1·Bt-
1, minus the part of households’ beginning of period wealth which is spent in consumption a·Vht-
1. Our final vh equation (44) is then obtained dividing the expression above by pt·Kt-1 and 
replacing it in (40): 
  
) 1 /( } ) 1 ( )] 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 [
] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 {[(
1 1
1 1
δ π θ µ µ τ
µ τ δ
− + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − +
+ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − =
− −
− −
t t t t b
t b t t
g u b ib
vh a ib vh
          (44) 
In sum, the intensive dynamics of the model above can be described, conditional on ib, by 
the following system of four equations determining the rate of growth in the stock of capital (9), 
government debt (38), households’ wealth (44), and capacity utilization (11):  
  t t t il u g g ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + = 1 0 ) ( θ β π α   
  ) 1 /( ] ) 1 ( [ 1 1 t t t t t t g u ib b b + ⋅ − + + ⋅ = − − θ γ   
 
) 1 /( } ) 1 ( )] 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 [
] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 {[(
1 1
1 1
δ π θ µ µ τ
µ τ δ
− + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + − +
+ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − =
− −
− −
t t t t b
t b t t
g u b ib
vh a ib vh
  
  1 1 1 ) ( − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = t t t vh a il A u ψ ψ   
which determine other financial stocks in the economy, namely from (16): 
      t t vh d ⋅ − = ) 1 ( δ                (45) 
where d is the stock of bank deposits normalized by the stock of capital; from (36): 
      t t t b vh l − ⋅ − = ) 1 ( δ               (46) 
where l is the normalized stock of loans, and finally from (15): 
      t t vh e ⋅ =δ                (47) 




  The temporary equilibria of the system therefore has the clear-cut graphic representation 
in Figure 2, and, again, the (period) comparative statics exercises are straightforward. Note that 
the distance between the stock of wealth and the stock of deposits in the bottom part of Figure 2 
(the CD segment) measures the (normalized) stock of equities which household holds for a given 
interest rate, while the distance between the stocks of deposits and the stock of bills (the BC 
segment) measures the stock of loans. 
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3.2 Model Properties 
The positions of the curves in Figure 2 are determined by history and, therefore, change every 
period. We note, however, that the vh curve will be higher than the b curve in all relevant cases. 
Indeed, consolidating the balance sheets in Table 1 tells us that b + 1 ≡ vh + vf. Since the 
maximum (relevant) value of vf is 1 (assuming that both loans and the price of equity go to zero, 
and firms do not accumulate financial assets), it is easy to see that vh has to be bigger than b. The 
d curve will always be below the vh curve and above the b curve, in order to imply a nonnegative 
stock of loans, and its position will depend on ib. 
  The model admits a convenient recursive solution. Given u (which can be calculated 
directly from the initial stocks, monetary and fiscal policies, and distribution and other 
parameters), one can easily get g, b, and vh and, given these last two variables, one can then 
calculate l, d, and vf, and, therefore, Tobin’s q, for q ≡ 1- vf. 
  Since the links among variables are often formed by combinations of parameters, it is 
useful to summarize the sign of links, as in the rows of Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Short-Run Links among Model Variables 
 u t g t vht vht-1 b t-1 
ut   -  -  >  0  - 
gt >  0    -  -  - 
vht  > 0  < 0    > 0  ? 
bt  < 0  < 0  -  -  > 0 
 
Most results are straightforward while some require a few additional comments.  
 Since  wealth  vh depends positively on u but negatively on g, the overall impact on wealth 
of an increase in the utilization rate which increases the growth rate is ambiguous. The first 
derivative shows that vh will increase with u if 
  ) /( ) 1 ( β θ α π θ µ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ > vh   
Therefore “small” values of wealth imply a positive link between the utilization rate and wealth 
itself, which is convenient for model stability: starting from small values for vh, a shock to the 
utilization rate cumulates through higher wealth, which feeds back into higher utilization rates 
and faster growth, but eventually, as wealth gets large enough, further increases in u will reduce 
vh stabilizing the model.   21 
 
 
  The graph in Figure 2 is drawn under the assumption that vh (and therefore d) depend 
positively on u. 
  The direct link between vht and vht-1 is positive, unless households spend in each period a 
fraction of their wealth a·vht-1 which exceeds their stock of deposits given by (1-δ)·vht-1, which 
is implausible. The overall impact of a change in vht-1 on vht is ambiguous, as shown in Table 4, 
since it depends on the relative size of the effects operating through u (see above); vht-1 (positive) 
and g (negative). From the discussion above, the size of the overall impact of the opening stock of 
wealth on the closing stock of wealth will decrease with the wealth level. 
  An increase in the opening stock of bills bt-1 will decrease the stock of wealth when the 
banks’ mark-up τb is “high,” e.g., when 
  ) 1 /( µ µ τ − > b   
Model stability requires that δbt/δbt-1 < 1, which will be true when the growth rate g is smaller 
than the interest rate ib. Again, stability requires that δvht/δvht-1 < 1, which cannot be ensured, 
but is likely to hold when the share of wealth spent on consumption is not too small relative to the 
size of household deposits. 
  More formally, model stability can be analyzed with the help of phase diagrams, reducing 
our system of four equations to a system in (the changes of) vh and b. Using (11) and (9) in (44) 
and (38) we get 
      ) ; ( 1 1 1 − − = ∆ t t t b vh f vh      (48) 
      ) ; ( 1 1 2 − − = ∆ t t t b vh f b      (49) 
Inspection of the explicit functions in (48) and (49) reveals different regimes, which may be 
either stable or unstable. Noting that δbt/δvht-1 < 0 always holds, we have six different regimes 










Table 5. Possible Model Regimes 
  δbt/δbt-1 < 0 
ib < g 
δbt/δbt-1 > 0 
ib > g 
δvht/δvht-1 < 0







of wealth to its 
opening value 
δvht/δvht-1 < 0







of wealth to its 
opening value 
δvht/δvht-1 > 0







The phase diagrams for all regimes are shown in Figure 3. We note that, although Regimes 2 
and 4 are theoretically possible, we have not been able to generate them with any combination of 
parameters, since—as discussed above—the relationship between vht and vht-1 is likely to be 
small and decreasing in vh. When the interest rate is small enough relative to the growth rate, 
Regimes 1 or 1b will apply, and we can obtain Regimes 3 or 3b for shocks which increase the 
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Figure 3. Model Phase Diagrams under Alternative Regimes 
 
 
  Summing up, the model admits at least one solution for economically sensible values of 
parameters, and can produce multiple equilibria under Regime 3. In most cases the model will 
thus converge to a long-run equilibrium, and in the next section we will investigate the properties 
of such equilibrium. 
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3.3 The Long-Period Equilibrium of the Model and its Interpretation 
3.3.1 The Long-Period Equilibrium 
Define long-period equilibrium as the situation where our stock ratios b, l, u, and vh are constant 
for given interest rates. By virtue of (9), this will imply steady growth. Applying these conditions 
to equations (9), (11), (38), and (44) above, let us derive a system of two equations, either in vh 
and u, or in vh and b. Both solutions are, of course, equivalent, but their graphical representation, 
and their formal derivation, provide different insights which are worth exploring.
22 
 
Deriving equations in vh and u  The first long-run equilibrium condition can be obtained 
directly from (11), solving for vh. In the long-run, there is a strictly positive relation between 
wealth and the utilization rate, which does not depend on the composition of wealth, but only on 
the effect of the interest rate on investment: 
     a ib A u vh / )] ( / [ 1 − = ψ       ( 5 0 )  
The second equilibrium condition is obtained by substituting u into b, and both into vh: 
    () u u
u
u ib








⋅ − ⋅ ⋅






   (51) 
where α1 is the accelerator from equation (13) and 
     π θ µ α ⋅ − ⋅ = ) 1 ( 2        ( 5 2 )  
    ib g b ⋅ ⋅ + + − = ] ) 1 ( 1 [ 1 0 2 θ τ ψ       ( 5 3 )  
   a ib g b + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − + − = ) 1 ( )] 1 ( ) 1 ( [ 1 0 3 τ µ δ θ ψ     (54) 
         ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 4 µ τ ψ − ⋅ + − = b        ( 5 5 )  
The system of equations (50) and (51) yields a cubic expression in vh, which confirms the 
possibility of multiple equilibria discussed above. Under Regime 1, our numerical analysis under 
a wide choice of parameters has shown that only one solution implies economically meaningful 
values for all variables, while under Regime 3, more than one (economically meaningful) 
solutions are possible. 
  Our equation (50) has been derived directly from our equations for growth equilibrium in 
the goods market, which is influenced by total wealth vh, but does not depend on the composition 
                                                 
22 See the Appendix for details on deriving the two sets of equilibrium conditions.   25 
 
 
of wealth or by the levels of government debt or by the stock of loans. We therefore label this 
curve GME for Goods Markets Equilibrium, since it gives the combination of utilization rates u 
and wealth to capital ratio vh which imply steady growth for any distribution of wealth. 
  Since our second equation for long-run equilibrium has been derived, for given 
(equilibrium) values of u and g, through the equilibrium values for b and vh, we will label this 
curve FE for Financial Equilibrium. Equation (51) has a negative slope under Regime 1b, and a 
positive slope under Regime 1. Under Regime 3, the slope of the FE curve varies with u, yielding 
multiple equilibria. 
 















Deriving equations in vh and b  An alternative derivation of the long-run solution in the b, vh 
space is also of interest. Applying the steady-state conditions to equations (38) and (44) above 
gives us the following two new long-period equilibrium conditions:  
 
     g b u b ib = ⋅ − + ⋅ / ) ( θ γ                         (56) 
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The equations above simply state that steady-growth is only possible when the rate of 
growth of both government debt (implied by the government deficit) and household wealth 
(implied by household saving) are equal to the rate of growth of the capital stock g.
23 
That is to say, the long period equilibrium is such that 
  1 1 1 / / / − − − ∆ = = − t t t t t t K K Vh SAVh B SAVg   
Now note that replacing (9) in (56) and (57) gives us the following conditions, which are an 
explicit form of the equations analyzed earlier for phase diagrams: 
     ) /( ) ( 4 3 2 1 vh vh b ⋅ + ⋅ − = ζ ζ ζ ζ      (58) 
    ) / ( ) / ( ) / ( 7 6 7 5
2
7 4 ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ + ⋅ + ⋅ = vh vh b     (59) 
where 
      1 1 ψ θ γ ζ ⋅ ⋅ − = A       ( 6 0 )  
      1 2 ψ θ ζ ⋅ ⋅ = a       ( 6 1 )  
     ib A − − ⋅ + ⋅ = γ ψ α ζ ) 1 ( 1 1 3      (62) 
      1 1 4 ψ α ζ ⋅ ⋅ = a       ( 6 3 )  
γ π µ θ ψ µ δ τ ψ ψ ζ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = ] ) 1 ( 1 [ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 0 5 a ib A b  (64) 
     A ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − = 1 6 ) 1 ( ψ π µ θ ζ       ( 6 5 )  
     )] 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 [ 7 b ib τ µ ζ + ⋅ − − ⋅ =      (66) 
 
where A is the normalized autonomous expenditure defined in (14). 
  As one would expect, the long-period steady-state of the model above is the point in 
which both equilibrium conditions are simultaneously valid, i.e., in which all stocks and flows are 
growing at the rate of growth of the capital stock, g. Note that increases in vh lead to increases in 
u and, therefore, on g, that is to say, higher values of vh imply higher equilibrium rates of growth. 
Note also that multiplying vh and b by (1+g)/u gives us the stocks of household wealth and 
government debt relative to total product, which are often used in policy discussions. 
                                                 
23 Note that the fact that pe = δ·Vh/(χ·K), from equation (25) above, implies that the price of equity will be constant 
in steady growth equilibrium.   27 
 
 
  A great part of the complexities associated with the system above stems from its first 
equation (58). To see why this is the case, note first that a positive (long-period equilibrium) b is 
only possible when both the equation’s numerator ζ1-ζ2·vh, which is a proxy of the government’s 
normalized “primary deficit,” and its denominator ζ3+ζ4·vh, which is the difference between the 
rate of growth of the stock of capital and the interest rate on government debt, have equal signs. 
Indeed, if, say, the numerator is negative (i.e., if there is a primary surplus) while the denominator 
is positive (i.e., the growth rate of the stock of capital is larger than the interest rate on 
government debt), then it is intuitively clear that the government debt/capital value ratio must be 
continuously declining (Regime 1). If, on the other hand, the numerator is positive (i.e., if there is 
a primary deficit) and the denominator is negative (i.e., the growth rate of the stock of capital is 
smaller than the interest rate on government debt), then the contrary is true, i.e., the government 
debt/capital value ratio is continuously increasing (Regime 3). 
  It is, then, intuitively clear that a constant government debt/capital value ratio requires 
either the combination of primary deficits and an interest rate on government debt smaller than 
the rate of growth of the capital stock (a situation similar to that of, say, the United States in 
2004) or a combination of primary surpluses and an interest rate on government debt larger than 
the rate of growth of the stock of capital (a situation similar to that of, say, Brazil in 2004). These 
two regimes imply radically different slopes for the equation above, as discussed earlier. An 
increase in vh in the “American” regime, for instance, decreases the primary deficit and increases 
the rate of growth in the stock of capital, therefore implying a smaller equilibrium b, so that the 
positive difference between b·g (the deficit required to keep b constant) and b·ib (the interest 
payments on public debt) is reduced to compensate for the smaller primary deficit. The contrary 
is true in the “Brazilian” regime, because an increase in vh implies an increase in the primary 
surplus, therefore implying a larger b so that the negative difference b·g and b·i is increased to 
compensate for the higher primary surplus. 
  Note also that the denominator of equation (58) cannot be zero, i.e., the interest rate on the 
government debt cannot be equal to the rate of growth in the stock of capital (or, algebraically, vh 
≠ -ζ3/ζ4). Indeed, in such a situation, a constant government debt/value of capital ratio is 
incompatible with a nonzero primary deficit (which forces b to infinite or minus infinite, 
depending on the case, whenever vh approaches the critical value). We can, therefore, get a better 
understanding of the different regimes analyzed earlier: there is one in which ζ3 > 0 (so that the   28 
 
 
“critical” value of vh is negative, for ζ4 is always positive) and one in which ζ3 < 0 (so that the 
“critical” value of vh is positive). 
  The second equation (59) in the system is slightly easier to understand. The key point here 
is that, as emphasized by Minsky (1982), government deficits help corporations to reduce their 
debt. This is easy to see in the balance sheet of banks: given Vh (and, therefore, D), higher values 
of B imply smaller values of L. This, in turn, has two effects. First, banks’ profits—and therefore, 
(capitalist) households’ disposable income and saving—are reduced. Second, firms’ debt service 
burden is reduced, leading to higher dividend payments to households (given firms’ higher profits 
net of interest payments) and, therefore, higher (capitalist) households’ disposable income and 
saving. The overall result of these opposing effects is summarized in ζ7. Given that ζ4 is 
unambiguously positive, a positive ζ7 implies that the equation will have a positive slope, i.e., 
that a higher value of b will lead to higher values of vh. The contrary is true, of course, when ζ7 is 
negative.  
 
3.3.2 Model Long Run Properties 
The equilibrium conditions derived above can be used to assess the response of the model to 
shocks. For instance, a standard Keynesian shock to government expenditure γ, and hence to 
government deficit, has an impact on growth even in the long run, as shown in Figure 5, where 
the dashed curves represent the equilibrium conditions after the shock. The major effects operate 
through the multiplier-accelerator effect, i.e., through a shift to the right of the GME curve, with a 
final increase in growth, the utilization rate, and the stock of households’ wealth. A second-order 
effect in the same direction is obtained through a change in the composition of wealth, i.e., an 
upward movement of the FE curve, originated by the now higher level of government debt b.   29 
 
 







  Models that neglect the impact of a shift in the composition of wealth, and thus calculate 
the results of the shock for a given vh, will thus underestimate the impact on growth of an 
expansionary fiscal policy. 
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  A second exercise illustrates the effects of a change in the distribution of income towards 
wages, obtained by increasing the share of profits on income π. Results are reported in Figure 6. 
It is interesting to note in this case that, although the increase in consumption generates an 
increase in the utilization rate, which stimulates growth through the accelerator effect, the drop in 
the value of the accelerator outbalances the former effect, so that the model turns out to be profit 
driven for our choice of parameters. 
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  We finally analyze the effects of an increase in the interest rate on government bills ib, 
which implies a higher interest rate on loans. In this experiment, the shocked solution is such that 
Regime 1 will still hold, e.g., ib < g. It is interesting to note that the negative impact on growth 
coming from the increase in the cost of borrowing is partially balanced by the increase in 
household income and wealth arising from interest payments, so that the utilization rate turns out 
to be higher in the new long-run growth path, although the increase in u is insufficient to balance 
the impact of the interest rate on growth, which is lower than in the previous growth path. In 
Figure 8 we show the dynamic response of model variables to the shock. 
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  If the size of the shock to the interest rate is such to generate a switch from the stable 
Regime 1 to the (potentially unstable) Regime 3, the result will be as in Figure 9. Note that the 
slope of the FE curve is now positive, as in Regime 3. It is interesting to note, from Figure 10, 
that the dynamic response of model variables to the shock is not explosive, but the rate of 
convergence is very slow. This implies that an unstable situation where government debt is 
constantly increasing relative to output may last for a very long period, and will eventually 
generate a financial crisis, e.g., a change in some other parameters in the economy. In our 
numerical simulations of the shock in Figures 9 and 10, at one point the stock of loans becomes 
negative, so that the final steady-state equilibrium, although feasible algebrically, would never be 
reached by a real economy. 
 
3.4 Why Bother with the Long Period Equilibrium? Some Methodological Considerations 
The model presented above uses “a Keynes/Marshallian short period with satisfied short-period 
expectations as the basic unit of analysis” (Skott 1989). Skott (1989) objects to this procedure, 
correctly noting that “if animal spirits stay constant [as they do in the derivations above, for we 
assume that both g0 and δ are constant] and short term expectations are always fulfilled [as it is 
also the case in the model above], then the economy must evolve a time path which is consistent 
with the initial long-period expectations; effectively, the economy must be in long-run 
equilibrium.” This is seen as a problem because Skott, like many Post-Keynesians, does not 
believe that Keynes’s long period equilibrium is a particularly useful concept. For example, 
Asimakopulos argues that “[the concept of long-period equilibrium] cannot have a significant role 
on a theory that embodies Keynes’s vision of the volatile nature of capitalist economies” 
(Asimakopulos 1991). In fact, he notes that even the “…notion of short-period equilibrium may 
be of limited use (…) [for] disappointed short-term expectations—with direct effects on 
production and employment decisions and cumulative effects on long term expectations and 
investment—would appear to be among the most important factors driving the economy” 
(Asimakopulos 1991). In light of these arguments, Skott concludes that “the possibility of 
disappointed expectations must be allowed for in an extension of Keynesian theory to cover long 
run developments” (Skott 1989). 
  We do not disagree with this general point. We note, however, that it implies neither that 
the long-period equilibrium is useless concept nor that it is necessarily useful to try to do justice 
to “the possibility of disappointed expectations” in formal models such as the one above.   35 
 
 
Beginning with this latter point, we note that it is awkward to assume that some agents’ 
expectations can be disappointed while other agents’ expectations are always “right.” In the 
context of the (simple) model above, this implies assuming that firms’ demand expectations could 
be wrong, so that inventories would need to be explicitly taken into consideration—unless one is 
willing to assume that prices adjust to guarantee that markets always clear (Skott 1989). The same 
could also happen to firms’ (and households’) expectations about stock market outcomes (and, 
therefore, firms’ total debt burden and households’ total wealth), firms’ (and households’ and 
banks’) expectations concerning government behavior (and, therefore, interest and tax rates), 
households’ expectations concerning labor demand (and, therefore, wage income), banks’ 
expectations of total deposits supply and loans demand, and so on. Moreover, assuming 
disappointed expectations in the context of a formal model implies having to say something also 
about how agents (form expectations and) react to these disappointments, and we know no 
developed Post-Keynesian theory of agents’ “reaction functions.”
24 In sum, trying to do justice to 
disappointed expectations in the context of formal models of “complete” monetary economies 
implies working with very complex constructs with a large number of variables (and reaction 
functions), many of which are without clear empirical counterparts (including previous periods’ 
expectation errors, and the parameters of the expectation formation and reaction functions 
assumed).
25 As a consequence, implementing Skott’s (and, for that matter, Godley’s) “ideal” 
approach is extremely difficult at best, and ultimately unfeasible at worst. Such a pessimistic view 
was articulated by Asimakopulos—in a slightly different context—as follows: “[Keynes] 
recognizes that allowances must be made for the interactions among the independent variables [in 
the sense of Chapter 18 of the General Theory] of his analysis. Changes in one variable can lead 
to changes in other variables, and the full effects of any initial change depend on these 
interactions. The complexity of these interrelations means that the analysis of changes over time 
cannot be adequately handled by mathematical equations” (Asimakopulos 1991). 
  Turning now our attention to the former point, we note that Keynes’s long-period 
equilibrium as interpreted above is nothing more than a useful ceteris paribus view of where the 
economy is (or, at least, could be) heading at any given point in time. To be sure, parameters are 
bound to change continuously and there is no reason to believe the economy will, in fact, remain 
in any long-period equilibrium trajectory. Still, we believe that the analysis of the properties of 
                                                 
24 Though the efforts of Backus et al. (1980); Skott (1989); Moudud (1998); and Godley (1996) and (1999), among 
others, are worth mentioning. 
25 See, for example, the seminal efforts by Godley (1996) and (1999).   36 
 
 
the “long-period equilibrium” so defined has important normative implications, for it allows one 
to study the characteristics of internally consistent dynamical trajectories—pioneered, as far as we 
know, by Mrs. Robinson and her various ages—and sheds considerable light on what will have to 
happen in true historical time. For example, if “long-period analysis” shows that the economy is 
heading to a situation in which debt-income ratios will be very high—or even explode, if the 
model turns out to be unstable in this way—one knows for sure that sooner or later the parameters 
of the system will have to change so as to prevent this outcome. If, on the other hand, the 
economy is close to a virtuous long-period path, one might suspect that abrupt parametric changes 
might have disruptive dynamical implications—so that policy makers, and the society as a whole, 
can debate whether or not to try to counterbalance them. In other words, rather than being 
ahistorical, long-period equilibrium analysis (and, in particular, the study of a sequence of ever 
changing long-period equilibria and their stability properties) as described above should help the 
construction of convincing historical narratives about sequences of short periods with continuous 
(but not directly modeled) parametric changes. While this may strike some macroeconomists as 
too modest a goal, it surely has the advantage of being a feasible one. In the same spirit, Godley 
and Cripps wrote: 
 
“we do not ask the reader to believe that the way economies work can be 
discovered by deductive reasoning. We take the contrary view. The 
evolution of whole economies is a highly contingent historical process. 
We do not believe it is possible to establish precise behavioural 
relationships (…) by techniques of statistical inference. Few laws of 
economics will hold good across decades and or between countries. On 
the other hand, we must exploit logic so far as we possibly can. Every 
purchase implies a sale: every money flow comes from somewhere and 
goes somewhere: only certain configurations of transactions are mutually 
compatible [or sustainable]. The aim here is to show how logic can help 
to organize information in a way that enables us to learn as much from it 
as possible. That is what we mean by macroeconomic theory (…)”  
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4. HOW DOES THE MODEL ABOVE RELATE TO THE HETERODOX SFC 
LITERATURE? 
 
As noted above, many heterodox SFC papers have appeared in the last years, and a major 
contribution by Godley and Lavoie (2007) has just been published. This increasingly large and 
diverse literature has tried to do several things, including: (i) checking the logical consistency of 
“incomplete” models;
26 (ii) extending the approach to deal with open economy issues;
27 (iii) 
discussing the theoretical compatibility of SFC models with the views of important authors who 
phrased their views in literary form;
28 (iv) producing applied models which can be used to study 
actual economies;
29 and (v) exploring the properties of models with different financial 
architectures and supply specifications.
30 Space considerations force us to focus here only on how 
the model above compares to the one proposed by Lavoie and Godley (2001–2002) and Godley 
and Lavoie (2007), which are particularly close to ours in spirit. Before we do that, however, we 
must say a few words on what seems to be the most controversial issue in the current heterodox 
debate on macrodynamics,
31 i.e., whether or not one should assume that the economy tends to 
some sort of “normal capacity utilization” in the long run. 
 
4.1 Harrod versus Kalecki 
Much has been written for and against the specific investment function used in the model above.
32 
Those who criticize it (mostly economists working in the classical tradition of Ricardo and Marx) 
point out that the long-period equilibrium is a position in which firms’ capacity utilization is 
consistent with firms’ expected profitability and there is nothing in equation (9) that ensures that 
this is the case. Alternatively, they prefer to assume, a la Harrod, a given (in the sense of being 
static or determined by fixed parameters) optimum capacity utilization level u and to impose as a 
necessary condition for the long-period equilibrium either that u = u* or that u fluctuates around 
u*. Those who support the specification we used above, in turn, argue, a la Kalecki, that firms are 
comfortable with a relatively wide range of capacity utilization levels (as depicted above). 
                                                 
26 E.g., Taylor (2004); Dos Santos (2005). 
27 E.g., Godley and Lavoie (2003); Lequain (2003); Taylor (2004). 
28 E.g., Dos Santos (2006); Moudud (1998). 
29 E.g., Foley and Taylor (2004); Godley (1999). 
30 E.g., Godley (1996) and (1999); Kim (2005); Lavoie and Godley (2001–2002); Godley and Lavoie (2007); 
Moudud (1998). 
31 E.g., Lavoie et al. (2004); Moudud (1998). 
32 See Lavoie et al. (2004) for a nice survey of the arguments.   38 
 
 
We believe it is illuminating to see this debate—as pointed out to one of us by Robert 
Blecker in an informal conversation—as a controversy about the “size of the comfortable range.” 
On one hand, classical economists do understand that issues such as firm heterogeneity, 
aggregation problems, and barriers to entry competition cast considerable doubt on the existence 
of one single and magical optimum aggregate capacity utilization figure. On the other hand, Post-
Keynesians do understand that capacity utilization cannot be anything in the long period. The 
point, then, is whether or not this comfortable range is better described as a point (as it would be 
the case if it is really narrow) or as a relatively wide range (as depicted above). We have no a 
priori reason to believe either one is the case. 
  We do believe that the heat of the debate will decrease in time, after more empirical 
evidence becomes available and the broad messages of each type of model become clearer. In 
fact, we see this paper as an attempt at clarification of the Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian model. On 
this respect, we point out that, if we were to assume a fixed utilization rate $ u* $ in the long run, 
then growth in the stock of capital would be uniquely given by (9), implying a unique equilibrium 
value for vh and all other variables in the model. The model we have deployed would, in this case 
only, show the trajectory of the economy towards its long-run, unique equilibrium, and any shock 
other than to parameters in equation (9) would have only temporary effects. 
 
4.2 Lavoie and Godley’s Model (2001–2002) 
The model presented here has many things in common with Lavoie and Godley (2001–2002) [LG 
from now on] for a very good reason. We were, in fact, inspired by LG, and tried here both to 
simplify it (in order to get well defined long-period results) and extend it (so as to allow the 
discussion of fiscal and monetary policies). 
  Since we have no significant methodological differences with LG—with the possible 
exception of our lack of inclination to tackle disequilibrium dynamics directly, at least in 
simplified theoretical models—we will limit ourselves here to discuss why it is so difficult to 
understand the nature of LG’s long-period equilibria, let alone its dynamics. 
  There are a few important differences between the model presented here and LG’s. The 
most important are related to the feedbacks from financial markets to growth: to begin with, their 




33 Moreover, households’ portfolio decisions are assumed to depend linearly on 
expected real rates of return of deposits and equities as, for example, in Tobin (1982). In the 
current version of our model, we had to simplify on both sides to achieve analytically tractable 
long-run solutions, but we believe that future extensions of our model that incorporate more 
complex interactions between the financial and the real sector in the spirit of LG will prove very 
interesting. To spell this out, notice that the only variables in our model which affect the financial 
equilibrium FE curve without affecting the GME curve directly are the dividends to profits ratio 
µ and, more importantly, the link ρ between the interest rate and the share of equities in 
households porfolio δ, which is our simplification for LG Tobinesque set of asset demand 
equations. 
  An increase in the desired share of equities in households portfolio δ will reduce the value 
of wealth in the steady growth path, since it increases the δ3 parameter—see equations (51) and 
(54), shifting the FE curve downwards, as in Figure 11. 






  The possible feedbacks from financial decisions to growth are therefore limited in this 
version of the model with respect to LG: a price we had to pay to keep the model tractable 
without resorting to numerical simulations. This is even more true for the most recent growth 
                                                 
33 However, in Godley and Lavoie (2007) they adopt our own simplification of the investment function.   40 
 
 
model presented in Godley and Lavoie (2007), which is far more sophisticated than ours, and yet 
shares some features, such as the permanent effects of fiscal policy on output. 
 
5. FINAL REMARKS 
 
In the sections above, we presented a very simplified SFC Post-Keynesian growth model and 
related it to the existing Structuralist/Post-Keynesian literature(s).
34 
  The long-run properties of the model have been derived from sequences of short-period 
equilibria, and we have discussed the conditions under which the model will converge to a stable 
growth path. Moreover, stable long-run growth paths have been discussed using two 
complementary approaches: the first focusing on equilibrium conditions in the goods and the 
financial markets, and the second stemming from the requirements of stable expansion of both 
government debt and household’s wealth. 
  We have no doubt that the model discussed above can be developed in several ways, many 
of which have already been suggested in the literature discussed above. We hope, however, to 
have clarified the structure and the limitations of this family of models. Though our specific 
derivations depend on the simplifying assumptions we made, we hope also to have convinced the 
reader that understanding the dynamics of (normalized) balance sheets and, therefore, the nature 
of long-period equilibria, such as the one discussed above, is generally more useful than the 
conventional wisdom leads us to believe. 
                                                 
34 The relation of this kind of modeling with mainstream macroeconomics was discussed in Dos Santos (2006) and, 
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APPENDIX 1.   DERIVATION OF THE LONG RUN SOLUTIONS 
 
Let’s start from the u equation in (11), setting vht = vht-1. 
 
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
1 0
π β α θ π
γ θ
+ ⋅ − − ⋅ − −
+ ⋅ − + ⋅
=
il g vh a
u   
Define ψ1 as in (12): 
  ] [ 1 0 1 γ θ ψ + ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ = il g vh a u   
Solving for vh yields the first equilibrium condition (50) in the text: 
  a ib A u vh / )] ( / [ 1 − = ψ  
with  
  ( ) a u vh ⋅ = 1 1 ψ δ δ   
Now move to the equation for b in (38), where we assume again long-run equilibrium, i.e., bt=bt-
1. 
  ) 1 /( ] ) 1 ( [ g u ib b b + ⋅ − + + ⋅ = θ γ   
  ( ) ( ) ib g u b − ⋅ − = θ γ   
Using (9) we get 
  () [ ] ib il u g u b − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − = 1 0 ) ( θ β π α θ γ   
which can be simplified using (31): 
  () { } ib u g u b b ⋅ + ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − = )] 1 ( 1 [ ) ( 1 0 τ θ β π α θ γ   
  ( ) ( ) u u b ⋅ + ⋅ − = 1 2 α ψ θ γ   
where ψ2, α1 are defined as in (53), (13) respectively. 
Note that b will be increasing in u as long as the growth rate g is greater than the interest rate 
on bills ib. More precisely,  
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which is negative when g > ib and 
  1 /α θ − > b   
Turning to vh in (44) and setting vht = vht-1 
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using the definition of ψ4 in (55). Substitute for g using (9): 
 
u b ib
a ib ib u g vh b b
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
= + − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
π θ µ ψ
µ τ δ τ θ α
) 1 (
} ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( {
4
1 1 0   
Using the definitions of ψ3 from (54): 
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we get the second equilibrium condition (51) in the text.   46 
 
 
APPENDIX 2.    LIST OF SYMBOLS 
Symbol Description 
A  Normalized autonomous expenditure 
B  Stock of government bills 
C  Households’ consumption 
D  Stock of bank deposits 
E  Stock of equities 
Fb  Banks’ profits 
Fd  Firms’ distributed profits 
FT  Total firms’ profits 
Fu  Firms’ undistributed profits 
G  Government expenditure 
K  Stock of capital goods 
L  Stock of bank loans to firms 
SAV  Total savings 
SAVg  Government savings 
SAVh  Households’ savings 
T  Total tax receipts 
Tf  Taxes on profits 
Tw  Taxes on wages 
Vf  Firms’ net worth 
Vh  Households’ net worth 
W  Wages 
X  Output 
Y  Total private sector income 
A  Propensity to consume out of wealth 
b  Government bills to capital ratio 
g  Growth in the stock of capital 
g0  Autonomous growth in the stock of capital 
ib  Interest rate on government bills 
il  Interest rate on bank loans 
l  Bank loans to capital ratio 
p  Price level 
pe  Market price of equities 
savh  Households’ savings to capital ratio 
u  Output capital ratio 
vh  Households’ wealth to capital ratio 
w  Money wage per unit of labor 
α  Accelerator effect through profits 
α1  Overall accelerator 
α2  Parameter - see (52) 
β  Exogenous accelerator effect 
γ  Government expenditure to capital ratio 
δ  Ratio of equities in households’ wealth 
ζ1  Parameter–see (60) 
ζ1  Parameter–see (61) 
ζ1  Parameter–see (62) 
ζ1  Parameter–see (63) 
ζ1  Parameter–see (64) 
ζ1  Parameter–see (65) 
ζ1  Parameter–see (66) 
θ  Tax rate   47 
 
 
θ1  Effect of the interest rate on loans on investment 
λ  Labor-output ratio 
µ  Dividends to profits ratio 
π  Profits share on income, before tax 
ρ  Link between the interest rate and the share of equities in h. wealth 
τ  Mark-up rate 
τb  Banks’ mark-up rate 
χ  Ratio of equities to capital 
ψ1  Multiplier 
ψ2  Parameter–see (53) 
ψ3  Parameter–see (54) 
ψ4  Parameter–see (55) 
 